Kajima Corporation, founded in 1840 as a carpenter’s shop in Edo and incorporated in 1930, stands as one of Japan’s “Big Five” general contractors alongside Obayashi, Shimizu, Taisei, and Takenaka. In the fiscal year ended March 2024, Kajima generated consolidated revenue on the order of ¥2.4–2.6 trillion (roughly USD 16–18 billion), with construction accounting for the overwhelming majority. Its identity is anchored in being a full-spectrum builder and developer that Japan repeatedly turns to for politically and technically sensitive work: from Tokyo Bay Aqua-Line and the Seikan Tunnel era through to post-2011 Tohoku reconstruction and decommissioning-related work at Fukushima Daiichi.
The industry environment Kajima navigates is mature, cyclical, and structurally domestic. Japan’s construction market is large but slow-growing, with public works tied to fiscal policy and private projects constrained by demographics. Within this environment, Kajima’s stature rests on its ability to deliver megaprojects that combine civil engineering, high-rise urban redevelopment, and disaster-resilient design. Its strategic identity is not merely “large contractor,” but “national infrastructure custodian” that can integrate engineering, finance, and risk management for assets that will define Japan’s physical landscape for decades.
Kajima’s economic engine is built on a dual pillar: domestic building and civil engineering on one side, and a smaller but strategically important real estate and overseas portfolio on the other. Historically, over 80 percent of revenue has come from domestic construction, split between building construction (office towers, logistics facilities, hospitals, rail stations) and civil engineering (tunnels, expressways, dams). Operating margins in core construction are thin—typically in the low single digits—yet the sheer scale of contracted backlog, often exceeding a year’s worth of sales, provides visibility and cash flow stability.
The “logic of capture” is rooted in lifecycle presence. Kajima does not only win bids to construct; it designs, builds, often co-invests, and then maintains or operates assets through concessions and PPP schemes. Urban redevelopment projects in Marunouchi or large logistics facilities around the Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan areas often combine design-build contracts with development and asset management fees. This layered participation across the value chain, from engineering design through facility management, allows Kajima to convert one-off projects into recurring income streams that fund its R&D in seismic isolation, automated construction, and environmental technologies.
Kajima’s moat is structural, technological, and relational. Structurally, it sits at the nexus of government ministries, major developers, and financial institutions, embedded in long-standing corporate networks that resemble a loose keiretsu ecology. Its repeated selection for high-profile public works—such as large segments of the Tohoku Shinkansen and key components of Tokyo’s subways—creates a self-reinforcing reputation loop that newcomers cannot easily penetrate.
Technologically, Kajima has invested heavily in proprietary construction methods and disaster-resilient technologies. It was an early leader in base-isolation seismic systems and in the use of advanced shield tunneling in dense urban environments. More recently, Kajima has developed automated construction robots and BIM-based integrated project management systems tailored to Japanese regulatory and site constraints. These are not off-the-shelf tools; they are embedded in internal standards, training, and supplier ecosystems. Competitors can imitate elements, but the integrated system—design know-how, accumulated site data, long-tenured engineers, and trusted subcontractor networks—is path-dependent and slow to replicate.
A defining strategic turning point came in the aftermath of the 1990s asset bubble collapse and the subsequent “Lost Decades.” In the early 1990s, like many general contractors, Kajima was heavily exposed to speculative real estate and overbuilt commercial properties. The crash and the 1997–1998 financial crisis forced a painful reassessment. Around the late 1990s and early 2000s, Kajima deliberately shifted from speculative ownership-heavy development toward a model emphasizing fee-based development, risk-sharing structures, and stronger balance sheet discipline.
The business logic was clear: survival required decoupling engineering excellence from pure asset risk. Kajima tightened project selection, reduced non-core asset holdings, and leaned into PPP and PFI schemes where it could leverage technical strength without bearing full demand risk. This repositioning meant slower top-line growth compared with the bubble era, but it restored financial resilience and enabled the company to play a central role in 2011 Tohoku reconstruction and in large-scale urban redevelopment in the 2010s without repeating the leverage excesses of the past.
Kajima’s dominance comes at the cost of structural conservatism. By prioritizing domestic, government-linked, and blue-chip private projects, it has accepted limited exposure to high-growth but volatile overseas markets. While it maintains operations in North America, Europe, and Asia—such as its long-standing presence in the U.S. through Kajima U.S.A.—international revenue remains a minority share. This sacrifices potential high-margin frontier projects in exchange for yen-denominated stability and political embeddedness.
Another trade-off lies in margins versus trust. To sustain long-term relationships with central ministries, local governments, and major developers, Kajima competes in a bidding environment where price discipline must be balanced with reputational obligations to deliver on time and with high quality. This often means accepting lower short-term profitability, absorbing cost overruns, and investing in safety and quality systems that do not immediately pay off. The reward is privileged access to repeat, large-scale work; the price is a structurally compressed margin profile relative to what its technical capabilities might command in less regulated, higher-risk markets.
For a Product Owner in a high-tech context, Kajima’s trajectory underscores the mental model of “lifecycle leverage.” Value is maximized not at a single release or contract, but by designing offerings that create long-term engagement: from design to operation, from initial deployment to continuous improvement. The product analogue is shaping roadmaps and architectures that keep you present across the customer’s full journey, rather than chasing one-off feature wins.
A second lesson is “disciplined conservatism.” Kajima’s post-bubble pivot shows that saying no to attractive but misaligned opportunities is a strategic act. For a Product Owner, this means resisting feature sprawl and market chasing. Instead, concentrate on domains where your team’s capabilities, data, and processes give you a compounding edge, even if that narrows your apparent TAM.
Finally, Kajima illustrates “trust as infrastructure.” Its willingness to trade margin for reliability built a reputational asset that continually feeds its pipeline. In digital products, this translates to prioritizing reliability, security, and transparent communication over short-term growth hacks. The cost is slower immediate metrics; the payoff is becoming the default choice for critical use cases, much as Kajima is for Japan’s most demanding physical infrastructure.